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Abstract
This paper develops a two-sector growth model in which institu-
tional investors play a significant role. A necessary and sufficient con-
dition is established under which these investors own the entire capital
stock in the long run. The dependence of the long-run growth rate
on the behaviour of such investors, and the effects of a productivity
increase are analysed.
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1 Introduction
In Pasinetti’s [1] famous post-Keynesian growth model two classes of agent,
workers and capitalists, save constant proportions of their income. On a bal-
anced growth path the rate of profit is independent of the workers’ savings
propensity. Meade (1963)[2] and Samuelson and Modigliani (1966)[3] prove
an "anti-Pasinetti" theorem which establishes the existence of an alternative
balanced growth path on which pure capitalists cease to exist and all capital
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is owned by workers. Kaldor (1966)[4] proposed an alternative insitutional
setting for post-Keyensian growth theory in which large capitalist corpora-
tions play an important role in savings and investment decisions. This kind
of corporate economy is described in Marris (1964) [5], Marris and Wood
(1971) [6], Wood (1975) [7] and Eichner (1976, 1985) [8] [9]. Moss (1978)
[10] extends Pasinetti’s analysis to a corporate economy by dividing Kaldor’s
(1966) household sector into workers and financial capitalists whose income
arises only from financial capital. O’Connell (1985, 1995) [11] [12] develops
an alternative approach to the corporate economy, showing that the "anti-
Pasinetti" theorem does not hold when firms re-invest a proportion of their
profits. Commendatore (1999) [13] extends the Post-Keynesian growth model
to a corporate economy, analysing the effects of firm and shareholder behav-
iour. Feld’man (1928) [14] and Mahalanobis (1953/4) [15] analyse the effects
of investment allocation on economic growth. This analysis is extended to a
multi-sector model by Araujo and Teixeira (2011) [16].
In this paper we consider a two-sector model in which institutional in-
vestors such as pension funds, unit trusts, insurance companies have an im-
portant role. It reflects Pasinetti’s idea that workers must own the capital to
which their savings have given rise, but also acknowledges that, in a modern
capitalist economy, these savings are typically mediated by institutions such
as pension funds. Dinenis and Scott (1993) [21] argue that pension funds
are a major vehicle for personal long-run saving in the UK economy. They
report that such funds controlled over £250bn of funds in 1989, their total
net assets constituting 38% of personal sector net financial wealth. These
funds owned 23% of UK equity, 21% of British government securities and
18% of British holdings of foreign equity. Apilado (1972) [20] investigates
whether pension savings in the US economy between 1955 and 1970 are a
substitute for other forms of saving. He concludes that they were in fact an
addition to other forms of saving and that, via an increase in total saving,
generated an increase in the growth rate.
Van Groezen et. al. (2007) [17] develop a two-sector growth model with
a capital intensive commodity sector (with endogenous growth) and a labour
intensive services sector. They analyse the effects on economic growth of
a switch to a more funded pension scheme. In this model increased savings
resulting from the pension reform generate higher growth in a closed economy
provided capital and labour are not strong substitutes. However, the opposite
is true for a small open economy. Hachon (2010) [19] analyses the effect of
the structure of pension systems on the growth rate. He contrasts "purely
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Beveridgian" pension systems, where every agent receives the same pension,
with "purely Bismarckian" systems, where pensions depend on agents’ wages.
Hachon’s focus is on the redistributional effects of pensions, in similar vein
to a paper of Docquier and Paddison (2003) [18].
2 Structure of the model
In an economy with institutional investors, investment and hence growth are
likely to be influenced by the decisions of such investors, but under mod-
ern capitalism we also observe high-tech firms which re-invest most of their
profits directly and rarely pay dividends. We refer to capital accumulated
from retained profits as "corporate capital", and that accumulated through
institutional investment as "institutional capital". Two questions which arise
naturally in this setting are:
• Will institutional investors eventually own the entire capital stock?
• Will the long run growth rate depend on the behaviour of those insti-
tutional investors and, if so, how?
Both these questions are analysed below.
The model assumes two different production sectors. Sector 1 consistes
of high-tech, capital intensive firms (e.g. electronics producers such as Ap-
ple) which invest all their profits, and also obtain investment from outside
institutional investors. It produces an output Q1 using labour L1 and capital
K1. Sector 2 consist of medium-tech, less capital intensive firms (e.g. con-
sumer durable producers) whose investment expenditure comes exclusively
from outside institutional investors. It produces an output Q2 using labour
L2 and capital K2.Total output of the economy will be denoted Q = Q1+Q2;
total labour employed in the economy will be denoted L = L1+L2; total cap-
ital employed in the economy will be denoted K = K1+K2. Both factors are
assumed perfectly mobile, equalising wage and profit rates between the two
sectors. Capital is assumed fully employed, but there may be unemployed
labour in the economy.
Outside institutional investors receive income based on wages (e.g. pen-
sion contributions) and from profits earned on their portion of the capital
stock. They invest a proportion, s, of their income, of which a share, θ, goes
to sector 1 and 1− θ, goes to sector 2.
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We establish conditons under which the growth rate of the economy is
independent of the institutional investors’ behaviour: in this case the share
of the capital stock funded from retained profits remains strictly positive.
There is also a balanced growth path along which the growth rate depends
on the behaviour of institutional investors; in this case the share of the capital
stock funded from retained profits disappears in the long run and the entire
capital stock is owned by institutions.
3 Wage and profit rates
Sector 1 consists of high-tech firms with capital-output ratio k1 =
K1
L1
and
output-labour ratio q1 =
Q1
L1
. Sector 2 consists of medium-tech firms with
capital-output ratio k2 =
K2
L2
and outout-labour ratio q2 =
Q2
L2
. It will be
assumed that:
q1 > q2 and k1 > k2 (1)
Togther these inequalities imply that:
K1
L1
>
K2
L2
(2)
Wage profit-frontiers can readily be derived for the two sectors. Let w
denote the wage rate and r the profit rate. Then:
Q1 = wL1 + rK1 ⇒ (3)
1 =
w
q1
+ rk1 (4)
And:
Q2 = wL2 + rK2 ⇒ (5)
1 =
w
q2
+ rk2 (6)
The two wage-profit frontiers are illustrated in figure 1.
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Figure 1. Wage-profit frontiers for sectors 1 and 2.
Inter-sectoral mobility of the two factors ensures that wage and profit
rates are determined at the intersection of the two frontiers yielding:
w∗ =
k2 − k1
k2/q1 − k1/q2
(7)
and:
r∗ =
q2 − q1
k2q2 − k1q1
(8)
Note that the wage-profit frontiers do not assume full employment of
labour: the availability of labour is never a constraint on growth. Capital is
assumed fully employed, and both factors are assumed instantaneously and
costlessly mobile between the two sectors.
4 Capital accumulation
Sector 1 (hi-tech) firms will be assumed to re-invest all their profits and also
to receive a share θ of institutional investment. So let K1 = X + Y where
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X = "corporate capital" (i.e. that portion of sector 1 capital funded from
retained profits) and Y = "institutional capital" (i.e. that portion of sector 1
capital funded by outside institutions). Sector 2 (medium-tech) firms will be
assumed to fund their capital accumulation entirely from outside institutional
sources. For notational consistency let Z = K2. Institutional investors own
a portion Y +Z of the capital stock. Assume all capital depreciates at a rate
δ.
Institutional investors will be assumed to have an income V , consisting
of a proportion t of the wage bill (e.g. pension contributions) and the profits
they earn on their portion of the capital stock. We therefore have:
V = tw∗ [L1 + L2] + r
∗ [Y + Z] (9)
Using the definitions of section 3 together with equation Y, this yields:
V = t
[
w∗K1
k1q1
+
w∗K2
k2q2
]
+ r∗ [Y + Z] (10)
Using the definitions above, this yields:
V = t
[
w∗(X + Y )
k1q1
+
w∗Z
k2q2
]
+ r∗ [Y + Z] (11)
It is now simple to derive accumulation equations for X, Y and Z:
X˙ = (r∗ − δ)X (12)
Y˙ = (1− θ)sV − δY (13)
Z˙ = θsV − δZ (14)
Substituting (11) into (13) and (14) and rearranging gives:
Y˙ = [(1−θ)s
[
tw∗
k1q1
+ r∗
]
−δ]Y +(1−θ)s
[
tw∗
k2q2
+ r∗
]
Z+
(1− θ)stw∗
k1q1
X (15)
Z˙ = θs
[
tw∗
k1q1
+ r∗
]
Y + [θs
(
tw∗
k2q2
+ r∗
)
− δ]Z +
θstw∗
k1q1
X (16)
Equations (12), (15) and (16) constitute a linear dynamical system in X,
Y and Z. Equation (12) can solved independently to give:
X(t) = X(0)e(r
∗
−δ)t (17)
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Now define the following shares in the total capital stock:
x =
X
K
; y =
Y
K
; z =
Z
K
(18)
We focus on conditions necessary and sufficient for the institutional in-
vestors to own the whole economy in the steady state (that is x = 0, or
Y + Z
K
= 1, in the steady state).
5 Dynamics of the model
We first establish:
Proposition 1 The dynamical system consisiting of equations (12), (15)
and (16) converges to a steady state in which x > 0 and the rate of growth
is given by g = r∗ − δ, if and only if
stw∗
(1− s)
[
1− θ
k1q1
+
θ
k2q2
]
≤ r∗.
Proof. The dynamical system clearly has g as one eigenvalue. Let the other
two eigenvalues be λ1 and λ2. The determinant of the dynamical system
is the product of the eigenvalues and the trace is their sum. Thus we may
write:
λ1λ2 = δ(δ − (1− θ)a2 − θa3) (19)
λ1 + λ2 = (1− θ)a2 + θa3 − 2δ (20)
where:
a2 = s
(
tw∗
k1q1
+ r∗
)
and a3 = s
(
tw∗
k2q2
+ r∗
)
(21)
The solution of these equations, which are symmetric in λ1 and λ2, is:
λ1 = −δ (22)
λ2 = (1− θ)s
(
tw∗
k1q1
+ r∗
)
+ θs
(
tw∗
k2q2
+ r∗
)
− δ = (23)
stw∗
(
1− θ
k1q1
+
θ
k2q2
)
+ sr∗ − δ (24)
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Solutions of the dynamical system take the form:
X(t) = X(0)egt (25)
Y (t) = b1e
λ1t + b2e
λ2t + b3e
gt (26)
Z(t) = c1e
λ1t + c2e
λ2t + c3e
gt (27)
It follows that the system will tend to steady state growth at a rate g if
and only if λ2 ≤ g, since λ1 < 0. We have g = r
∗ − δ, so that λ2 ≤ g if and
only if:
(1− θ)s
[
tw∗
k1q1
+ r∗
]
+ θs
[
tw∗
k2q2
+ r∗
]
≤ r∗ ⇐⇒ (28)
stw∗
[
1− θ
k1q1
+
θ
k2q2
]
≤ (1− s)r∗ ⇐⇒ (29)
stw∗
(1− s)
[
1− θ
k1q1
+
θ
k2q2
]
≤ r∗ (30)
which is the required condition. From equations (25), (26) and (27) it is
clear that, if λ2 ≤ g, x =
X
K
−→
X(0)
b3 + c3 +X(0)
> 0 as t → ∞. That is
x > 0 in the steady state, as required.
So, provided the condition (30) of proposition 1 is satisfied, the steady
state growth rate is independent of the behaviour of institutional investors,
and the long-run share of corporate capital in the total capital stock is non-
zero.
We now establish the converse of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 The dynamical system consisting of equations (12), (15) and
(16) converges to a steady state in which x = 0, and the rate of growth is
given by λ2 = stw
∗
(
1− θ
k1q1
+
θ
k2q2
)
+ sr∗ − δ, if and only if condition (30)
is violated.
Proof. By the argument of Proposition 1, λ2 > g if and only if condition (30)
is violated. Then, from equations (25), (26) and (27), the steady state growth
rate must be equal to λ2. Moreover, since λ2 > g and λ1 < 0, x =
X
K
→ 0 as
t→∞. That is, x = 0 in the steady state, as required.
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So, if the condition (30) of proposition 1 is violated, the steady state
growth rate does depend on the behaviour of institutional investors. In par-
ticular it increases with t (proportion of the wage bill received by institutional
investors), s (the invested proportion of institutional investors’ income) and
θ (the proprtion of that investment that goes to sector 1 (high tech) firms).
6 Numerical simulations
A simple Matlab program was written to simulate the dynamical system
of section 5 above. Initial conditions and parameters were set as follows:
δ = 0.02, k1 = 3.5, k2 = 2.5, q1 = 10.5, q2 = 10.0, X(1) = 45.0, Y (1) = 25.0,
Z(1) = 30.0. This implies equilibrium wage and profit rates of w∗ = 8.936
and r∗ = 0.043 respectively. The economy simulated is thus one which,
initially contains a significant high tech sector, with accumulation financed
prodominantly from retained profits. Initially, it also includes a medium tech
sector, financed by institutional investors. Table 1 shows values of x (share
of corporate capital in total capital stock) at time = 20 and the growth rate
at time = 20 for various values of the parameters. The first four lines of the
table relate to parameter combinations which satisfy condition (30), so that
the long-run share of corporate capital in the total capital stock (x) is non-
zero, and the long run growth is independent of the investors’ parameters
(it is equal to r∗ − δ = 0.023). The next four lines of the table relate to
parameter combinations which violate condition (30), so that the long-run
share of corporate capital in the total capital stock (x) is zero and the long
run growth rate does depend on investors’ parameters, according to equation
(24).
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s t θ x(20) growth rate at LR value of x LR growth rate
time = 20
0.2 0.05 0.3 0.58 0.0097 0.93 r∗ − δ =
0.2 0.05 0.9 0.58 0.010 0.93
0.2 0.20 0.3 0.51 0.016 0.71 0.023
0.2 0.20 0.9 0.51 0.018 0.68
0.8 0.05 0.3 0.40 0.028 0.0 0.026
0.8 0.05 0.9 0.40 0.032 0.0 0.028
0.8 0.20 0.3 0.22 0.060 0.0 0.059
0.8 0.20 0.9 0.21 0.071 0.0 0.059
Table 1.
Figures 2 - 5 show output for the simulations described in the first four
lines of table 1, corresponding to a low institutional savings ratio (0.2). In
each case the share of corporate capital in sector 1 trends upwards towards an
upper limit between 0.93 and 0.68. The long-run growth rate is independent
of institutional investors’ parameters, being equal to r∗− δ = 0.023. Figures
6 - 9 show output for the simulations described in the last four lines of
table 1, corresponding to a high institutional savings rate (0.8). In each case
thw share of corporate capital trends downwards towards zero. The long
run growth rate now depends on institutional investors’ parameters. It is
significantly higher than the long-run growth rate of figures 2 - 5, ranging
from 0.026 to 0.059.
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Fig 2. Output of simulation for s = 0.2, t = 0.05, θ = 0.3
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Fig. 3 Output of simulation for s = 0.2, t = 0.05, θ = 0.9
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Fig. 4 Output of simulation for s = 0.2, t = 0.2, θ = 0.3
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Fig. 5. Output of the simulation for s = 0.2, t = 0.2, θ = 0.9
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Fig 6. Output of the simulation for s = 0.8, t = 0.05, θ = 0.3
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Fig. 7. Output of simulation for s = 0.8, t = 0.05, θ = 0.9
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Fig. 8. Output of simulation for s = 0.8, t = 0.2, θ = 0.3
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Fig. 9. Output of simulation for s = 0.8, t = 0.20, θ = 0.9
7 Increase in productivity
We now consider the effect of an increase in labour productivity in sector
1 (high-tech) with all else (including labour productivity in sector 2) held
constant. Figure 2 depicts the wage-profit frontiers for the two sectors. An
increase in labour productivity in sector 1 from q11 to q12 increases the profit
rate from r∗ to r∗∗ and decreases the wage rate from w∗ to w∗∗. It also affects
the income of institutional investors and the proportions of that income aris-
ing from the two sectors of the economy. The combined effect on corporate
capital over time is shown in figures 11 and 12. For the high productivity
simulations, q1 is set at 12.5; for the low productivity simulations q1 is set
at 10.5. In the former case the wage rate is 6.67 and the profit rate is 0.133.
In the latter case the wage rate and profit rate are as in section 6 above,
8.936 and 0.043 respectively. Figure 11 depicts the simulation output for
s = 0.2, t = 0.05, θ = 0.3, corresponding to line 1 of table 1, in which the
share of corporate capital increases much more rapidly in the low productiv-
ity case. Figure 12 depicts the simulation output for s = 0.8, t = 0.2, θ = 0.9,
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corresponding to line 8 of table 1, in which the share of corporate capital
declines much more rapidly in the high productivity case.
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Fig. 10. Wage-profit frontiers for low and high productivity in sector 1.
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Fig.11 Share of corporate capital for high and low productivity in sector 1
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Fig. 12 Share of corporate capital for high and low productivity in sector 1
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8 Conclusions
We analyse an economy in which corporate saving is undertaken by high-
tech firms with high capital/labour ratios and correspondingly high labour
productivity. Institutional saving is undertaken by pension funds, insurance
companies and unit trusts which invest in high and medium tech firms (the
latter having lower capital/labour ratios and correspondingly lower labour
productivity). In high profit economies, the steady state growth rate is inde-
pendent of the behaviour of institutional investors and the steady state share
of corporate capital is non-zero (i.e. the institutions do not own the whole
economy in the long run). In low profit economies the steady state growth
rate does depend on the behaviour of institutional investors. In particular
it increases with t (proportion of the wage bill received by institutional in-
vestors), s (the invested proportion of institutional investors’ income) and θ
(the proportion of that investment that goes to sector 1 (high tech) firms).
Moreover, the steady state share of corporate capital is zero (i.e. the insitu-
tions do own the entire economy in the long run). That share declines more
rapidly or rises more slowly if labour productivity rises in sector 1.
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